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Introduction 
It is well known that professional football is on the one hand connected to serious competition 
law concerns for instance in the field of restrictive market entry or joint selling of commercial 
rights and on the other hand to law exemptions and public tolerance.  
This toleration is mainly backed up by the specific nature of sport, a legal concept established 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The concept recognizes specific sport 
characteristics, like for instance the freedom of internal organization of sport associations with 
the typical monopolistic pyramid structure, that are automatically taken into account when 
assessing whether sporting rules or the organisation of sport comply with EU competition 
law. 
However, there is no automatic exemption from the Community competition rules for sport 
organisations and their activities as soon as economic activities were pursued. This is 
reflected in the so called Bosman judgement in 1995 and the more recent Murphy judgement 
in 2011. As a matter of fact, European jurisprudence hereby showed decisive action to 
provide open purchase markets and open sales markets in line with provisions of internal 
European market and contrary to arguments referring to the specifity of sport. 
Different from widely opened purchase and sales markets, the football league event markets 
still remain separated on national lines. This sport specific peculiarity is enforced by the 
relevant pyramidal structure provisions of sport associations, notably the articles 49 and 51 of 
the UEFA statutes. These statutes have not been challenged legally irrespective of obvious 
legal concerns.  
With this in mind, the research question arises, whether the artificial market partitioning on 
European football event markets is compatible with EU competition law.  
 
Methods 
To answer this question, a legal and economic analysis was conducted. The methodological 
approach comprised the three-step legal evaluation, devised by the European Commission in 
the wake of the much-quoted Meca-Medina-judgement. Consequently, this procedure is 
applied in order to evaluate whether the relevant UEFA provisions infringe Articles 101 
and/or 102 TFEU. With attention to the obvious incompatibility of the UEFA provisions with 
the internal European market, the study focuses on the regional market definition and the 
possibility of factual justifying. Correspondingly, the assessment is complemented by an 
economic and longitudinal analysis of the overall market power relations using Herfindahl-
Hirshman indices.  
 Results  
In fact, there are good reasons to assume an infringement of community law. This result is 
based on previous statements of EU legislation, chiefly the Murphy judgement in joint cases 
C-403/08 and C-429/08 in 2011. Furthermore, the assessment can rely on several research 
contributions (Monti, 2000; Pijetlovic, 2015; Weatherill, 2005). In like manner, the empirical 
market structure results supply further arguments against the assumption of a legitimate 
objective.  
All things considered, the results contribute to a new perspective in terms of serious antitrust 
concerns about the current European football landscape. In particular, the national market 
foreclosure of professional football leagues is presumably incompatible with European 
competition rules (Article 101 of the TFEU) and the European single market.  
 
Discussion 
The results would seem to indicate, that an sport policy antitrust exception does not apply on 
geographical portioning of football product markets. Hence and in the light of polarised 
football competitions in Europe, these contentious issues suggest several policy and 
management implications. 
In the event of an appeal against the geographical pyramid of sports associations or an 
proactively motivated policy action, the possible consequence might be an event market 
liberalisation. This liberalisation might include league mergers or the supranational 
assembling of first tier football leagues, providing clubs and leagues the opportunity to join or 
create larger markets (Kesenne, 2007; Vrooman, 2007). Notably, a hypothetical market 
opening even might affect non-European associations and in particular the wealthy Arab 
football leagues by giving Arab clubs the chance to play in regular competitions against 
European top teams.  
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